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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
PRESENTED BY THE COURT 
TO AMICUS CURIAE 
CAN AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE BRING AN ACTION FOR 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION BASED ON A VIOLATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY WHERE THE EMPLOYEE WAS 
TERMINATED BECAUSE OF HIS AGE, BUT WHERE THE 
EMPLOYER HAS FEWER THAN FIFTEEN EMPLOYEES 
AND THUS HAS NO RIGHT TO BRING HIS CLAIM 
BEFORE THE UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND 
LABOR DIVISION BECAUSE THAT AGENCY LACKS 
JURISDICTION? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant has not met his burden of persuasion to establish a public policy exception to 
the "at will" employment doctrine. In order to rise to the level of a declaration of a clear and 
substantial public policy, the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it affects the 
public as a whole must be examined. No common law or constitutional standard exists in Utah 
prohibiting discrimination based upon age. The legislative enactments of the federal government 
and the State of Utah are self-limiting in their effect, and not applicable to the public as a whole. 
The Utah Antidiscrimination Act and a repealed provision that existed under the Utah 
State Personnel Management Act do not create a public policy that can provide a basis for a 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy against employers or in favor of employees 
not covered by those statutes. This Court has consistently recognized that the legislature 
regularly is called upon to balance important and sometimes conflicting policy concerns and has 
deferred to the statutory limitations provided by the legislature. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CLARIFICATION OF THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE 
The issue presented to the amicus curia representing that "the employee was terminated 
because of his age", does not accurately describe the established facts in this case. This is an 
interlocutory appeal from the order of the lower court dismissing appellant's cause of action for 
tortious wrongful termination. No finding of fact or determination has been made by the lower 
court regarding facts in dispute. It is disputed that Burton was an "employee". It is disputed that 
the "old guys" statement was made. 
Because of the natural tendency of "buzz words" to inflame rather than inform, reference 
to the facts which were not in dispute in the lower court is appropriate for the sake of 
perspective: 
1. It is undisputed that Exam Center had a policy regarding contracting with doctors to 
perform medical services for Exam Center's customers on an "as needed" basis. It is 
undisputed that a pool of eight (8) doctors was available. 
2. It is undisputed that all of the doctors with whom Exam Center contracted were 
within the "protected class" of over the age of 40, and all but one was of the age of 65 
through 74. 
3. It is undisputed that Exam Center employed no full-time doctors of any age prior to 
July, 1994. 
4. It is undisputed that the pool of eight (8) available doctors was reduced when Burton 
was told that his services were no longer required. 
5. It is undisputed that a doctor was hired as a full-time employee by Exam Center in 
July, 1994. 
The sad irony of this case is that had Appellee been an employer with more than 15 
employees, thus within the jurisdiction of the U.C.A § 34A-5-101, et. seq., Utah Anti 
Discriminatory Act (hereinafter "UADA"), the merits of Appellant's claim would have been 
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evaluated and determined by the employees of the UADA with the specialized expertise in 
employment law. Appellee would not have been required to expend its resources in defending 
this litigation and appeal. 
II. THE JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW IS WHETHER TO INCLUDE 
DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON AGE AS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL 
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
A. The well established law in the State of Utah is that employees for an 
indeterminate term are considered to be "at will". 
It is firmly established law that employment in the State of Utah is considered to be "at-
will". The burden of establishing any exception to the "at-will" doctrine is on the proponent. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
B. The burden of establishing an exception to the "at will" employment doctrine 
is upon the Appellant. 
Case law has established that the strict "at will" doctrine is subject to a "public policy 
exception". Berube at 1043; Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). An 
individual claiming to have been wrongfully terminated from employment in contravention of a 
clear and substantial public policy may bring an action sounding in tort. Peterson v. Browning, 
832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). The proponent must establish that a public policy exists which is 
clear and substantial, rooted in statute or the constitution, and clearly recognized in the State of 
Utah. 
. . . . [I]t is not the purpose of public policy restrictions on the at-
will employment doctrine to deprive employers of all discretion in 
discharging an indefinite-term employee. At this point, it is 
sufficient to declare that the public policy that may be the basis for 
a wrongful discharge action should be defined in the first instance 
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by legislative enactments and constitutional standards which 
"protect the public or promote public interest." 
Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043; Hodges at 165-66. 
The burden to establish that the discharge of the employee violated public policy was met 
by the plaintiffs in Peterson, (the wrongful termination of an employee after he refused to falsify 
tax and customs documents); Hodges, (the wrongful termination of an employee based upon a 
false criminal accusation known to the employer to be false); and Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 
P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) (a wrongful discharge of an employee after he insisted that his bank 
employer adhere to the Utah Financial Institutions Act). 
Appellant sidesteps this burden by claiming that freedom from age discrimination already 
is an established exception to the employment "at will" doctrine, separate and distinct from the 
UADA, without identifying any constitutional standard, legislative enactment, or judicial 
decision which carves out that exception. 
C. Statutes should be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statute and to promote justice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 states: "The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statute and to promote justice." 
In its review of the legislative enactments of the Utah Legislature, the court should 
review a statute as a whole, including all limitations of application and jurisdiction. Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-2. The legislative intent behind the statute can be discerned by its definitions of to 
whom it pertains, and the restrictions contained therein as to whom it is applicable. 
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It would be inequitable and unjust to surgically extract from the UADA and the Utah 
State Personnel Management Act the portions which would effectively grant each citizen the 
right to be free from age discrimination and make a small employer liable under a tortious 
wrongful termination lawsuit yet deny the small employer the protections and procedures 
available under those statutes. Such a result would be in contravention of Utah Code Ann. § 68-
3-2 as it would not effect the objects of the statute and would result in injustice. 
D. No common law or constitutional standard prohibits discrimination based 
upon age 
None of the arguments of the Appellant and the amici curia claim that any common law 
right exists in the State of Utah to be free from discrimination based upon age, neither do they 
claim protection against age discrimination based in the Utah Constitution. Instead Appellant 
and the amici curia briefs have engaged in circuitous and somewhat confusing logic in support of 
their contention that a "clear and substantial declaration of public policy" exists which has risen 
like the Phoenix to generally prohibit age discrimination in the State of Utah. This tortured 
theory mightily tries to avoid the application and limitations of the UADA but simultaneously 
seeks to bootstrap the UADA definition of discrimination based upon age as an unlawful 
employment practice as a declaration of public policy applicable to the public as a whole. The 
argument presented in the amicus curiae ACLU brief at pp. 7-11, is as follows: 
Appellant is not making a claim under the provisions of the UADA 
and is not required to seek redress through the administrative 
procedures of the UADA, 
Because 
The action of employment termination allegedly committed by 
Appellee was not a "discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice" as defined by UADA 
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Because 
Appellee was not an "employer" as defined by the act. 
And 
Appellant's claim was not pre-empted by the UADA, and the 
UADA his not his exclusive remedy, 
Because: 
The UADA, and the provision of the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act (now repealed), plus Federal statutes, include a 
prohibition against discrimination based upon age, 
Therefore: 
Appellant is entitled to point to those legislative provisions as a 
"clear and substantial declaration of public policy" prohibiting 
discrimination based upon age, and allowing him to bring a tort 
claim against Appellee for wrongful termination. 
This approach, which tries to construe the inapplicability of the UADA to the small 
employer as a "license to discriminate", amicus curiae ACLU brief at p. 5, turns the burden of 
persuasion on its head. 
This Court has prescribed the test for determining whether any public policy is 
sufficiently "clear and substantial" to support a cause of action for discharge in violation of 
public policy1. Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 966 
(Utah 1992); Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281; Berube, 111 P.2d at 1051. 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" to support a cause of action for 
discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it 
affects the public as a whole. The very words "clear and substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As 
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in a statute are not expressions of public 
policy. Many statutes merely regulate conduct between private individuals or " 'impose requirements whose 
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.' " Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data 
Corp., 41 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 217, 765 P.2d 373, 379 (1988)). The following questions are relevant to 
determining whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy. First, one must ask whether the policy 
in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only. Second, one must inquire 
whether the public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we should place the policy beyond 
the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing 
and of equal bargaining power. Since these are the consequences of qualifying a policy as a basis for the tort action, 
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Appellant has the burden of persuading this Court to include this theory as an exception to the 
"at will" employment doctrine by showing the strength of the declaration of public policy and its 
application to the public as a whole. 
III. THE UADA AND A REPEALED PROVISION OF THE UTAH STATE 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT DO NOT CREATE A PUBLIC POLICY 
CLAIM AGAINST EMPLOYERS OR IN FAVOR OF EMPLOYEES NOT 
COVERED BY THE STATUTES 
Contrary to the arguments made by amici curiae ACLU and AFL-CIO, a provision of the 
Utah State Personnel Management Act that has been repealed never did, and does not now, create 
a clear and substantial public policy in favor of an employee not covered by the statute. The 
Utah State Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-1 et seq., by its own terms, 
applies only to the State of Utah as an employer and State employees. The appellant has never 
alleged that he is an employee of the State and there is no basis for claiming that Utah State 
government policies with respect to its employees should be superimposed on private sector 
employers. 
Moreover, the antidiscrimination provision contained in the Act was repealed in 1995. 
The provision now in place states that the "state, its officers, and employees shall be governed by 
the provisions of § 34A-5-106 of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act concerning discriminatory or 
unfair employment practices." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-4. Id. In sum, a repealed provision of 
the Utah State personnel statute cannot be deemed to be a separate declaration of the State's 
public policy regarding age discrimination for purposes of providing foundation to a wrongful 
discharge claim. 
these considerations should inform the evaluation of the policy itself. See id. at 1288 (Zimmerman, J., concurring 
and dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); see also Foley, 765 P.2d at 379-80 & n. 12. 
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Amid curiae ACLU and AFL-CIO add no support to appellant's argument that the 
UADA is a clear and substantial policy statement that should be applied to an employee 
specifically exempted from its provisions. The ACLU's proposition that the Labor Commission 
somehow has jurisdiction over claims against employers with fewer than fifteen employees is 
mistaken. The jurisdiction of the Commission is set out under the statute as limited to "the 
subject of employment practices and discrimination made unlawful by this chapter." Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-5-103 (emphasis added). Thus, the power of the Commission is, by statute, limited 
to the employment practices of those covered by the UADA. Under those terms, the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over employers with fewer than fifteen employees. See, 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-102(7)(a). 
The California Supreme Court rejected just such an attempt to parse the state fair 
employment practices statute to avoid its restrictions. In Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333 (Cal. 
1998), a plaintiff attempted to sue her individual supervisor under a wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy claim based on the public policy contained in California's Fair 
Employment and Housing Act. The court held: 
It would be absurd to forbid a plaintiff to sue a supervisor under 
the FEHA, then allow essentially the same action under a different 
rubric. Because plaintiff may not sue Baird as an individual 
supervisor under the FEHA, she may not sue her individually for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 
957 P.2d at 1348. Similarly, the UADA, which does not provide the appellant with a cause of 
action against an employer of fewer than fifteen employees cannot give rise to a claim against the 
very same employer under a different rubric. 
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Reliance by the ACLU and the AFL-CIO on Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 
1996), is also misplaced. The Molesworth plaintiff attempted to bring a common law cause of 
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on sex discrimination. The 
Maryland court ruled that Maryland's public policy against sex discrimination was "ubiquitous," 
since the Maryland Fair employment Practices Act was but "one of at least thirty-four statutes, 
one executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland that prohibits discrimination 
based on sex in certain circumstances." 672 A.2d at 613. Neither the ACLU, the AFL-CIO or 
the appellant has pointed to a Utah constitutional provision, an executive order, or any other 
statutory provisions, with the exception of the repealed Utah State employment provision, that 
sets forth a public policy statement on age discrimination. 
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074 (Cal. 
1994), not the decision in Molesworth, is clearly applicable here. The Jennings court rejected a 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy action involving age discrimination against an 
employer not covered under the California FEHA because the employer in question had too few 
employees to be covered by the statute. The court held that the exception of small employers 
from the FEHA ban on age discrimination "was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable 
from the legislative statement of policy." 876 P.2d at 1076. 
In sum, there is no Utah statute or constitutional provision that can provide a basis for a 
common law claim of discharge in violation of public policy involving age discrimination. The 
only provisions presented to this court, by their own terms, do not provide claims against 
employers or in favor of employees within the statutory provisions and in the case of the state 
government employee statute, the provision has, in addition, been repealed. 
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IV. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE 
LEGISLATURE REGULARLY IS CALLED UPON TO RECONCILE 
IMPORTANT AND SOMETIMES CONFLICTING CONCERNS AND HAS 
DEFERRED TO THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS PROVIDED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE 
The Legislature is constantly called upon to reconcile important, yet sometimes 
conflicting, public policies. This Court has consistently, and appropriately, deferred to the 
Legislature's balancing of public policies. Two examples are illustrative. 
Grandparents who had acted as parents of a deceased child sued to recover for losses they 
suffered upon the death of the child under Utah's wrongful death statute, which provides for suit 
by a "parent or guardian" only. Utah Code Ann.. § 78-11-6. This Court rejected their claim, 
relying on the express statutory coverage to exclude a claim by grandparents, holding that "the 
law creating the right can also prescribe the conditions of its enforcement. State Farm Mutual 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Parmley v. 
Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 64 Utah 125, 228 P. 557, 560 (1924)). This Court recognized the 
unfortunate result but stated that "'[t]he fact that the result in some circumstances may be to 
unreasonably restrict the class of persons who can bring a wrongful death action is an argument 
for amendment of the statute, not for ignoring its words.'" Id. at 1187 (quoting Kelson v. Salt 
Lake City, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1989)). 
A second example involves the right of an automobile accident victim to collect general 
damages resulting from injuries, a common law right that had long been recognized by Utah 
courts. By passing statutory provisions limiting personal injury protection, Utah Code Ann. § 
31a-22-309(l), the legislature limited the recovery of general damages to a very specific 
category—those whose accident-related medical expenses exceed $3,000.00 or those who have 
suffered death, permanent disability, dismemberment or permanent disfigurement. Thus, a right 
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that an individual enjoyed at common law was actually abrogated by statute, yet, Utah courts 
have continued to uphold this decision of the Legislature. See, e.g., Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 
556 (Utah App. 1997) (court deferred to legislature in limiting general damages where plaintiff 
not included in exceptions under statute). 
Similarly, an action based on age discrimination against an employer with fifteen or more 
employees was created by statute, the Utah Antidiscrimination Act, and its application should be 
limited to the statutory provisions. The Legislature's decision to balance the needs of small 
employers with those of individuals is the decision that this Court should uphold. Any 
unfortunate result that ensues may be an argument for amendment of the UADA but not for 
ignoring its plain language. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court has not been directed to any common law, constitutional standard, applicable 
federal statute, or any persuasive enactments of the Utah Legislature upon which this Court 
should rely for the extraordinary action of including a claim of discrimination based upon age 
among the clear and substantial public policies previously recognized as an exception to the 'at 
will" employment doctrine of the State of Utah. 
Neither the UADA nor the provision of the Utah State Personnel Management Act (now 
repealed) rise to the level of a "clear and substantial declaration of public policy" because each of 
those statutes, by their respective terms, limits its application to those persons it specifically 
defines. Clearly the Legislature did not intend thereby to make a public policy statement 
regarding age discrimination applicable to the public at large. Had the Legislature truly intended 
to make a public policy declaration prohibiting age discrimination universally, it could have done 
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so. The Legislature defined employers subject to the UADA as those with 15 or more 
employees. 
According to the Department of Workforce Services more than 60 percent of employers 
in Utah have fewer than 15 people on staff, but their employees comprise only about 9 percent of 
the state's total employee positions. Utah's small employers have justifiably relied upon being 
exempt from the jurisdiction of the UADA and its applicability. It would patently unfair and 
have catastrophic results to have a judicial determination that the UADA and the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act state a clear and substantial public policy againsft age discrimination 
for all employees in the State of Utah. Small employers, who are least able to afford it, would 
then be exposed to the expense and burden of defending against claims, meritorious or not, of 
age discrimination in a tort action rather than in the administrative procedure afforded larger 
employees under the UADA. 
Expansion of age discrimination as an unlawful employment practice applicable against 
all employers and employees in the State of Utah should be a decision of the Legislature, made 
after due investigation, hearings, debates, and a vote by legislators answerable to their 
constituents. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of Jul 
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